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Abstract 
 
Based on an institutional and legal mapping of the field across Europe, this article 
explores the different barriers to the effectiveness of the EU’s regime on the recovery 
and confiscation of proceeds of crime. The aim is to provide a better understanding of 
the challenges that arise in this field and suggest possible areas of legal or policy 
intervention. But it is also – using the example of asset confiscation – to contribute to 
debates about the effectiveness of the EU’s legal strategy in building a genuine area 
of freedom, security and justice. The article argues that, despite the adoption of new 
legislation in this field and the stronger institutional framework introduced by the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the effectiveness of the EU’s action is unlikely to significantly 
improve. The legal rules still present a number of deficiencies and the emphasis on 
formal legal solutions has come at the expense of broader questions of transposition 
and utilisation, which are however crucial to ensuring effective recovery.  
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Introduction 
 
In recent decades, the confiscation and recovery of criminal assets has assumed a 
prominent position in the fight against organised and other profit-driven crime. While 
the empirical evidence is scarce, the link is widely accepted: by targeting their 
underlying financial motivation, asset confiscation contributes to discouraging these 
kinds of criminal activity. The logic gained particular ground when viewed alongside 
a relative failure of traditional criminal justice tools to reduce organised crime. The 
profits generated by this type of criminal activity - especially through drug trafficking 
- tend to be far too great for the prospect of criminal prosecution and/or conviction to 
act as an effective deterrent. Moreover, asset recovery is also assumed to have other 
positive societal impacts, including promoting the public’s confidence in the justice 
system, enhancing redistributive justice for victims of crime and adding to state 
budgets.  
 
Asset recovery became particularly important in the European Union (EU)1 where 
organised crime has been a long-standing problem in several Member States. 
Moreover, the building of the internal market, with its twin effects of abolishing 
internal frontiers and enabling the free circulation of goods, capital, services and 
persons, was perceived as facilitating the activities of such criminal groups. This not 
only reinforced the need for coordination and cooperation at EU level, but also raised 
the issue of the EU’s own responsibility in the propagation – and hence the 
combatting – of cross-border crime. That responsibility was further emphasised by the 
introduction of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, which gave substance to the link between the EU’s aims on the economic 
plane and questions of security and justice. As a result, asset confiscation became 
central not only to the fight against organised crime across Europe and the pursuit of 
broader social objectives, but also to the EU’s singular aspiration of creating an AFSJ. 
This led to the adoption of several measures designed to improve asset recovery and 
confiscation across the EU Member States, with the most recent instruments having 
entered into force in 2014.2  
 
However, the EU’s intervention does not appear to have resulted in any significant 
increase in the amount of confiscated assets. While there is no comprehensive 
statistics on the number of domestic or cross-border confiscation orders or the exact 
*The authors would like to express their gratitude to colleagues at RAND Europe, namely Barry Irving 
and James Forsaith; and researchers at the ANTICORRP research project, namely Salvatore Sberna 
and Pedro Gomes Pereira. In addition, the authors would also like to thank the anonymous reviewer for 
providing constructive and critical comments. 
1  The 1997 Action Plan to Combat Organised Crime emphasise the link between effective asset 
recovery and the combatting of organised crime.  
2 See in particular Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 
2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the EU [2014] OJ 
L138/114 (hereinafter the ‘new Directive’).  
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value of confiscated assets, interviews with practitioners and selected national 
statistics suggested little to no improvement over time. At one extreme, the Austrian 
extended confiscation regime introduced in 2002 has virtually never been used. At the 
other extreme, the low rate and limited success of confiscation orders remain key 
concerns for practitioners even in forerunner countries such as Italy, the Netherlands, 
or the UK, where the value of confiscated assets has reached the order of 100 million 
EUR per year. Likewise, there is no evidence of significant cross-border use of the 
EU instruments, calling into the question the added value of the EU’s intervention.  
 
In order to shed light on the lack of progress in a crucial area of criminal law and 
policy, this article seeks to identify the main legal and institutional factors that impede 
the effectiveness of the EU’s asset confiscation regime and thus explain why 
coordinated action at EU level has not significantly improved the recovery of criminal 
proceeds across Europe. In doing so, it will also evaluate the extent to which the new 
Directive on asset confiscation and the Treaty of Lisbon are likely to make a 
difference. Moreover, given a large number of EU instruments designed to build the 
AFSJ3 are also characterised by a degree of approximation of national legislation and 
implementation of the principle of mutual recognition – the two pillars of the EU’s 
asset confiscation regime – our findings may also be relevant to other areas of 
criminal justice where the EU’s action has not proven particularly effective. This is 
particularly likely given that some of the legal impediments to effective action in this 
field are linked to broader systemic features of the EU’s institutional and 
constitutional arrangements rather than to considerations that are specific to asset 
confiscation. As such, identifying the impediments to effective EU action in this field 
is not only important to improving asset recovery work across Europe but may also 
contribute to debates about the EU’s broader strategy in matters pertaining to the 
AFSJ.  
 
To that end, section 1 starts by outlining the EU’s legal framework in the area of asset 
confiscation, as well as the problems that have arisen in practice. Drawing on a legal 
and institutional mapping of the field across Europe,4 the article then moves on to 
identifying the causes of the low recovery rates. Section 2 focuses on the legal 
impediments, showing how the relevant EU rules still present a number of 
deficiencies. Second 3 turns to the transposition stage, exploring why the 
transposition of the relevant EU legal tools has remained rather poor across Member 
States. Section 4 then looks at the institutional barriers that prevent the effective use 
3 See also T. Obokata, ‘Key EU Principles to Combat Transnational Organised Crime’ (2011) 48 
Common Market Law Review 801.  
4  The legal and institutional mapping we draw upon provided the background work for a report 
commissioned as part of the Commission’s impact assessment that led to the adoption of the new 
Directive. See F. James, B. Irving, E. Nanopoulos and M. Fazekas, ‘Study for an Impact Assessment 
on a Proposal for a New Legal Framework on the Confiscation and Recovery of Criminal Assets’, 
(2012) RAND Europe, Cambridge, hereinafter the ‘RAND report’. 
 3 
                                                 
of these instruments in practice. Finally, section 5 offers some suggestions as to the 
possible way forward.  
 
 
1. Asset Confiscation in the EU  
 
1.1. Legal Framework 
 
Despite the fact that the EU’s powers in the field of criminal law and justice have 
been historically rather limited, the EU has been quite active in the field of asset 
confiscation. The EU’s action in the field has comprised three main elements, 
although only the first two are considered in greater detail in this contribution: a 
degree of harmonisation of relevant domestic laws and procedures, provisions on the 
mutual recognition and enforcement of confiscation and freezing orders and some 
institutional measures.  
 
1.1.1. Approximation of Domestic Laws  
 
Efforts to approximate the laws of the Member States in this area date back to Joint 
Action 98/699/JHA, 5  which required the adoption of measures enabling the 
confiscation of the instrumentalities and proceeds of crime for which a criminal 
conviction has been obtained (‘ordinary confiscation’) and/or of assets of equivalent 
value (‘value confiscation’). In line with the general trend prevalent in the aftermath 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam – the so-called ‘second wave’ of EU criminal law6 – this 
Joint Action was replaced by Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA,7 which enshrined 
the relevant provisions in a more prescriptive legal form. This reform had little 
substantive impact, however, as the relevant rules still consisted of broadly defined 
obligations and were primarily intended to promote the implementation of relevant 
international instruments rather than to give effect to a distinct EU agenda or policy in 
this area.  
 
The first steps towards a more comprehensive EU regime started to emerge with the 
adoption of Framework Decision 2005/2012/JHA on the harmonisation of 
confiscation laws. This instrument required the adoption of measures enabling the 
confiscation of the proceeds and instrumentalities for ‘all criminal offences 
punishable by deprivation of liberty for more than one year’ and introduced 
provisions on extended confiscation, a technique designed to enable the confiscation 
of assets that cannot be linked to the specific offence for which a person has been 
5 Joint Action 98/699/JHA [1998] OJ L333/1.  
6 V. Mitsilegas, ‘The Third Wave of Third Pillar Law: Which Direction for EU Criminal Justice’ 
(2009) 34 European Law Review 530. 
7  Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA on money laundering, the identification, tracing, freezing, 
seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime [2001] OJ L182/1. 
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convicted but nonetheless derive from that person’s criminal activities. However, 
partly because of differences in national rules of criminal procedure, including as 
regards the standard and burden of proof, and partly because of human rights 
concerns about the use of presumptions to establish the criminal origin of the assets,8 
the Framework Decision did not establish a uniform regime but left Member States a 
choice between three different options. Moreover, extended confiscation was only 
required for a list of serious offences and only when these were committed within the 
framework of a criminal organisation. 
 
These instruments will be partially replaced by the new Directive,9 which entered into 
force in April 2014 and which Member States have until October 2016 to 
implement. 10 The new Directive partly consolidates the existing rules. It requires 
ordinary and value confiscation11 for a number of serious offences listed in Article 3, 
such as corruption and organised crime, including where the conviction results from 
proceedings in absentia. It clarifies that indirect proceeds include proceeds obtained 
by reinvestment – a question that was left open by Framework Decision 
2005/2012/JHA. It also unifies the regime for extended confiscation, which is now 
required for all situations where a court is satisfied that the property in question ‘is 
derived from criminal conduct’12 on the basis of the circumstances of the case, such 
as when there exist discrepancies between the person’s income and the total value of 
their assets. Extended confiscation is no longer limited to offences committed in the 
framework of a criminal organisation, but it only applies to crimes that are liable to 
give rise to economic benefit, thus maintaining a focus on organised crime. Moreover, 
the regime is still singled out in terms of its scope of application: whilst it is available 
unconditionally for a number of cases described in Article 5 of the new Directive,13 it 
only applies to the offences listed in Article 3 if they carry a custodial sentence of a 
maximum of at least four years.  
 
In addition, the new Directive brings a number of novelties in this field, even though 
it is a rather watered-down version when compared to the original proposal put 
forward by the European Commission. The first set of changes concerns the scope of 
asset confiscation powers. The Directive introduces a limited form of non-conviction 
8  Although extended confiscation is not considered to be a criminal charge, the presumption of 
innocence still applies and has for example been held to prevent the confiscation of assets for crimes of 
which the person has been specifically acquitted. See Geerings v Netherlands (2007) 46 EHRR 49. 
9 JA is completely replaced whilst only some provisions of the two Framework Decisions are. See Art 
14 of the new Directive.  
10 The original deadline for the implementation of the new Directive was October 2015, but was 
subsequently extended to October 2016.  See Corrigendum to Directive 2014/42/EU [2014] OJ 
L138/114. 
11 Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA seemed to only require it where the assets could not be seized. 
See arts 2 and 3 Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA. 
12 Art 5 of new Dir.  
13 These are broadly speaking connected to corruption, participation in a criminal organisation, child 
pornography and illegal system and data interference. See art 5(2) intent (a) to (d) of the new Dir.  
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based confiscation14 where a conviction is not possible because the accused is ill or 
has absconded but the proceedings have already been initiated and would have led to 
a criminal conviction if he or she had been able to stand trial. This form of criminal 
non-conviction based confiscation differs from the civil non-conviction based regimes 
– also known as civil forfeiture – introduced in some Member States,15 as the latter 
tend to target directly the property (rather than a defendant) and dispense with the 
requirement that criminal conduct be established to a criminal standard of proof, 
relying instead on civil rules of evidence and procedure. Like extended confiscation, 
moreover, the EU’s criminal non-conviction based confiscation is limited to offences 
that are liable to result in economic benefit. The new Directive also for the first time 
explicitly requires the confiscation of assets in the possession of third parties16 when 
they ‘knew or ought to have known that the purpose of the transfer of acquisition was 
to avoid confiscation’, which must be established by ‘concrete facts and 
circumstances’, such as when the relevant property was obtained ‘free of charge or in 
exchange for an amount significantly lower than the market value’. The term third 
party specifically excludes bona fide persons,17 whose rights remain unaffected.  
 
The second set of novelties relate to the stages of the asset recovery process that are 
being regulated at EU level. The original instruments primarily focused on the 
confiscation stage i.e. the circumstances under which courts can order confiscation. 
Council Decision 2007/845/JHA, which requires Member States to establish asset 
recovery offices18 to facilitate the tracing and identification of cross-border criminal 
assets, including by exchanging information and best practices, touched upon aspects 
of the investigation stage. But there were no attempts to lay down common minimum 
standards to ensure that assets are preserved pending the completion of the criminal 
proceedings and the adoption of a confiscation order (the preservation stage) or that 
such orders are enforced in practice (the enforcement stage).  
 
By contrast, the Directive requires the adoption of measures enabling the freezing of 
assets and covering both prohibitions on use and the temporary seizure of property, as 
well as measures aimed at ensuring the management of frozen property. Freezing 
orders can be issued by any ‘competent authority’ in all cases where the property 
might be liable to subsequent confiscation, including from third parties, and shall 
include the taking of ‘urgent action’. Moreover, the Directive specifies that such 
orders must remain in force for as long as necessary but that the property must be 
14  For a critical analysis see M. Simonato, ‘Directive 2014/42/EU and Non-Conviction Based 
Confiscation: A Step Forward on Asset Recovery?’ (2014) 6 New Journal of European Criminal Law 
213. 
15 E.g. The UK Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.  
16 Under art 3(3) of Framework Decision 2005/2012/JHA, Member States were simply encouraged to 
enable the confiscation of property acquired by the closest relations of the accused or transferred to a 
legal person over which the accused has a controlling influence.   
17 Art 6(2) of the new Dir.  
18 This complements the pre-existing CARIN practitioner network. 
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immediately returned if no confiscation order is adopted.19 Management measures, on 
the other hand, are left entirely at the discretion of Member States, although these 
should at least include the possibility to sale or transfer the property. As regards the 
enforcement stage, the new Directive includes an express obligation for Member 
States to ensure the execution of confiscation orders and to enable the detection and 
tracing of property even after the conviction or the criminal non-conviction based 
proceedings. 20  This latter addition is probably a result of the fact that, in many 
Member States, the possibility to confiscate criminal assets ends when the 
proceedings are finalised, which not only encourages criminals to provisionally 
conceal their assets but also tends to rush the financial investigation. However, in line 
with the multi-layered nature of the EU’s system of governance, which largely leaves 
the enforcement of EU law to domestic authorities, the relevant provision does not 
otherwise prescribe how or by whom such enforcement should take place.   
 
Finally, the new Directive introduces a number of procedural safeguards in this field, 
beyond the requirement to interpret and apply relevant EU law in line with 
fundamental rights, including the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Thus, provided 
this does not jeopardise the conduct of the investigation, freezing and confiscation 
orders must, together with the reasons for their adoption, be communicated to the 
affected person as soon as possible after their execution21 and be open to challenge 
before a court.22 Moreover, Member States shall ensure that third parties are entitled 
to claim ownership of the property and that victim can seek compensation, although it 
is not clear whether the latter claim is contingent upon domestic law providing for 
such a cause of action.   
 
 
1.1.2. Mutual Recognition  
 
The second set of EU instruments - Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA 23 on the 
mutual recognition of freezing orders and Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA24 on 
the mutual recognition of confiscation orders – are aimed at facilitating the recovery 
of assets in cross-border cases. They are based on the principle of mutual recognition, 
which was first introduced by the EU judiciary in the context of the internal market25 
as a means to enable the free circulation of goods and persons. Although its 
19 Art 8(3) and (5) of the new Dir.  
20 Art 9 of the new Dir.  
21 ibid, art 8(2).  
22 ibid, art 8(4). 
23 Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA of 22 July 2003 on the execution in the European Union of 
orders freezing property or evidence [2003] OJ L196/45. 
24 Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA of 6 October 2006 on the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition to confiscation orders [2006] OJ L328/59.  
25 Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon [1979] ECR 649. 
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transposition into the criminal law field is far from uncontroversial,26 it has come to 
be described as the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters27 
and rests upon the alleged mutual trust in the criminal justice systems of the Member 
States corroborated by a presumption of compliance with fundamental rights across 
the EU. As such, the two instruments require freezing and confiscation orders to be 
recognised and enforced in other Member States. Practically speaking, the orders are 
transmitted alongside a ‘certificate’ to the competent authorities in the executing 
State, which must recognise them without further formalities and to forthwith take the 
measures necessary for execution. 28 Mutual recognition is automatic for a list of 
offences29 punishable by at least three years of imprisonment in the issuing State, but 
dual criminality is still necessary in other cases i.e. recognition can be refused if the 
crime to which the freezing or confiscation order relates is not a criminal offence 
under the laws of the executing State. In addition, the Framework Decisions still 
allow (optional grounds) – and even require (mandatory grounds) – competent 
authorities to refuse or postpone recognition or enforcement in certain situations.30  
 
The two instruments are unaffected by the new Directive, but the Framework 
Decision on the mutual recognition of freezing orders will be absorbed into Directive 
2014/41/EU on the European Investigation Order, which extends the mutual 
recognition principle to almost all investigation measures involving the transfer of 
evidence and adds to the general move towards the formal integration of the old third 
pillar into the Community pillar, including through the conversion of Framework 
Decisions into EU Directives. The original proposal purported to abolish the dual 
criminality, territoriality and non bis in idem principles, but these were re-introduced 
into the final version. Criticism over the principle of mutual trust and a set of adverse 
judgments by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)31 – and subsequently 
the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU)32 – over its practical operation in the context of 
the European common asylum system also led to a provision allowing Member States 
for the first time to refuse execution where there are substantial grounds to believe 
that this would be incompatible with fundamental rights.    
 
1.2. Effects in Practice   
 
26 E.g. A. Hinarejos, ‘Integration in Criminal Matters and the Role of the Court of Justice’ (2011) 36 
European Law Review 420.  
27 Tampere European Council, 1999.  
28  See Art 5 of Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA and Art 7 of Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA. 
Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA explicitly states that freezing orders are to be executed in the same 
way as for a freezing order made by an authority of the executing state; Framework Decision 
2006/783/JHA does not contain an equivalent statement for confiscation orders. 
29 The list includes, but goes far beyond, the offences covered by Art 3 of the New Directive. See Art 3 
of Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA and Art 6 Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA. 
30 Art 7 and 8 of Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA and Art 8 of Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA. 
31 M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece (2011) 53 EHRR 2. 
32 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 NS, judgment of 21 December 2011, nyr.  
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Despite this plethora of legal instruments and the corresponding reforms that they 
have thus far prompted at domestic level, the amount of confiscated assets in the EU 
remains marginal. As we mentioned, the Austrian extended confiscation regime 
introduced in 2002 has virtually never been used, while in Hungary, authorities only 
confiscate assets in cash form, which is evidenced by a mere 598 forfeiture 
procedures out of 86 705 convictions with nearly half relating to economic and 
property crimes. Admittedly, in countries with a longer history and practice in asset 
confiscation such as Italy, the Netherlands, or the UK, recovery rates suggest that 
utilisation is higher. In Italy, for example, the value of confiscated assets reached 
around 100 million EUR per year in 2007-2009, while it went well above 100 million 
GBP per annum in the UK. But according to interviewed practitioners, the potential 
for improving utilisation rates remains high even in those countries. Moreover, those 
practitioners pointed out that mutual recognition instruments were rarely or never 
used.  As such, the problem of utilisation applies with equal force in cross-border 
cases.  
 
Admittedly, there are significant methodological difficulties in measuring the ‘gap’ in 
confiscated assets, that is the gap between the amount of confiscated assets compared 
to the optimal amount of confiscated assets, and hence the exact extent of the 
problem. This is because it is virtually impossible to identify and determine the total 
amount of criminal assets i.e. including those connected to crimes whose perpetrators 
have not been identified or formally charged. Moreover, there is a general paucity of 
data available on even the most essential aspects of asset confiscation work across the 
28 Member States, including the costs incurred by public administrations and the total 
amount of confiscated assets. The new Directive is likely to improve those figures as 
it includes a number of obligations on the keeping of statistical data in both domestic 
and cross-border cases. But it will take some time even after transposition before 
these obligations begin to have a meaningful impact. Under the present conditions, 
the most widely used indicator of success has been the ratio of confiscated to 
identified assets. However, it is too narrowly focused on the officially recorded 
aspects of the recovery process and fails to take into account the fact that a large 
proportion of criminal assets are simply not identified.  
 
Yet, numerical data from a number of selected examples 33  in relation to which 
sufficient statistical information was publicly available as well as the interviews we 
carried out across Europe34 all confirmed the basic difficulty of increasing the rate of 
recovered assets, including in countries most heavily investing into asset recovery, 
and already showed a number of important utilisation challenges. As such, based on a 
legal and institutional mapping of the field across EU Member States, the next three 
33  Countries with more extensive statistics and research are Bulgaria, France, Hungary, Ireland, 
Romania, and the UK. 
34 See Rand report, above n 4, annexe A.  
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sections explore some of the barriers to the effectiveness of the EU’s action in the 
field of asset confiscation.  
 
 
2. Legal Barriers  
 
The first set of barriers to the effectiveness of asset confiscation arises from 
deficiencies in the EU legal framework itself. While the two Directives will bring 
several improvements to the field, a number of considerations still cast doubt over the 
extent to which the relevant rules provide Member States with the necessary legal 
tools to ensure effective recovery at domestic level (2.1) or noticeably advance 
cooperation in cross-border cases (2.2).  
 
2.1. Barriers to Effective Confiscation Laws   
 
One of the purposes of approximating national legislations is to ensure that all 
Member States possess the legal tools necessary for effective recovery and the legal 
mapping indeed suggested that the EU could play an important role in this area as not 
all Member States have in place comprehensive asset confiscation regimes. Yet, the 
EU regime itself contains a number of important gaps. There may of course be 
questions as to whether the EU should require Member States to introduce civil non-
conviction based regimes, as these raise a number of human rights issues35 and have 
been controversial in some of the Member States where they have been introduced. 
But it is less clear why the non-conviction criminal regime should not for example 
extend to instances where the defendant enjoys immunity from trial, which may be 
particularly crucial in countries where public officials are themselves enmeshed (e.g. 
through corruption) in criminal networks.  
 
Even when there is no formal gap, some of the rules are too vague or leave the 
Member States’ too much discretion to ensure that effective rules will be put into 
place at domestic level. The point about discretion is particularly pronounced as 
regards the new provisions on the management of frozen assets, the enforcement of 
confiscation orders and the social re-use of confiscated assets,36 all of which merely 
impose loosely defined targets for the Member States to achieve rather than concrete 
obligations. Yet, these aspects of the recovery process are crucial to meeting the 
social (rather than deterrence) objectives of asset confiscation and could have a strong 
role to play in incentivising asset confiscation work. On the other hand, the point 
about definitional ambiguities can be illustrated with reference to the term ‘third 
party’ in the new Directive. Although the preamble specifies that third party 
35 For a discussion see K. Mahmutaj, ‘Cash Forfeiture following Acquittal: An “Affront to Public 
Perception” or a Breach of a Fundamental Human Right?’, (2009) 11 Criminal Law Review 783.  
36 S. Montaldo, ‘Directive 2014/42/EU and Social Reuse of Confiscated Assets in the EU: Advancing a 
Culture of Legality’ (2015) 6 New Journal of European Criminal Law 195. 
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confiscation should extend to legal persons,37 it is not clear how the requirement of 
knowledge will, in those cases, be satisfied and hence whether this falls within the 
mandatory scenarios in relation to which Member States must introduce appropriate 
legislation. If not, that would be a significant omission as corporate bodies and other 
legal persons are often used to conceal criminal proceeds.  
 
In some instances, the EU regime not only lacks clarity but also imposes conflicting 
obligations upon Member States. For example, Article 2 of Framework Decision 
2005/2012/JHA, which in principle remains unaffected by the new Directive even 
though they cover substantively the same ground, requires ordinary confiscation in 
relation to all ‘criminal offences punishable by deprivation of liberty for more than 
one year’, whilst the Directive only does so for a number of listed offences. This can 
be explained by the fact that Article 83(1) TFEU, on which the new Directive is partly 
based, only allows the adoption of minimum rules as regards the definition of 
criminal offences and sanctions ‘in areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-
border dimension’, which are expressly listed in that provision.38 But it does create 
inconsistent obligations in the particular area of overlap i.e. ordinary and value 
confiscation. Incidentally, it is unlikely that Framework Decision 2005/2012/JHA is 
compatible with Articles 83(1) and Article 82(2) TFEU – the other legal basis for the 
new Directive, creating further confusion in the legal landscape. The conflict between 
these two instruments also signals a deeper ambivalence about the EU’s approach to 
asset confiscation. Indeed, it is not clear whether ordinary confiscation is seen as a 
punitive tool, in which case it could potentially apply to all criminal offences, or 
whether it is designed to deter particularly serious forms of crime, in which case its 
scope of application ought to be limited. The question is not merely theoretical as our 
legal mapping suggested that differences in domestic laws can sometimes be 
explained by differences in the conceptualisation of the nature and purpose of asset 
confiscation.  
 
In addition, it is not clear that the EU measures necessarily address the kind of legal 
issues that appear to be crucial to an effective asset recovery regime. Often, the issue 
is not so much whether a particular Member State has asset confiscation laws in place, 
but the precise modus operandi of the regime, including as determined by that State’s 
broader principles of criminal law and procedure. Thus, for example, low rates of 
confiscation orders often result from the fact that domestic law prescribes a high 
standard of proof as to whether particular assets are proceeds of crime, which is 
difficult to meet.39  
37 ibid, rec 24.  
38 The current list covers terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and 
children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of 
means of payment, computer crime and organised crime. All the offences to which the new Directive 
applies can be linked to one of those crimes. See article 3 of the new Directive.  
39 J. Benseler, ‘Forfeiture Legislation in Germany: Legal Basis and Prosecution Practice’ (1997) 5 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 203, 207.  
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In fact, there are doubts as to whether a uniform approach to asset confiscation is 
necessarily the most effective way to enhance the effectiveness of domestic 
confiscation laws. Our legal mapping suggested that different States might require 
different legal tools depending on the particular form and scale of organised criminal 
activity in their territory and/or the broader characteristics of their criminal justice 
system. Thus, extended confiscation may be redundant or disproportionate in 
countries like France, which criminalises the unjustified ownership of assets of 
particular categories of people, or in countries like Spain where money laundering is 
defined without reference to a specific predicate offence. On the other hand, civil non-
conviction based confiscation might be needed in countries with stricter criminal law 
standards, which prevent convictions. Likewise, countries with particularly 
entrenched forms and high levels of organised crime may need more far-reaching 
tools than countries were criminality is relatively low. In fact, the threat posed by 
mafia-induced crime in Italy was crucial to the ECtHR’s judgment that Italy’s regime, 
which combines elements of both non-conviction based and extended confiscation 
and is thus amongst the most far-reaching in Europe, did not constitute a 
disproportionate interference with the right to property.40 Moreover, there may be a 
greater need for effective preventative tools in large financial and/or banking centres, 
such as Luxembourg, which may be more prone to financial crime.  
 
2.2. Barriers to Cross-Border Cooperation   
 
There are also a number of important legal barriers to cross-border cooperation, some 
of which directly result from the instruments on mutual recognition, whilst others 
relate to the EU’s broader legal strategy in fostering cross-border cooperation.  
 
From a purely formal perspective, it is unclear whether the particular form mutual 
recognition takes is conducive to facilitating and streamlining cooperation between 
judicial authorities. Many practitioners reported that the mutual recognition 
certificates were rather complicated and lengthy, adding to, rather than diminishing, 
the bureaucratic burden on the State apparatus. In fact, practitioners reported that they 
usually prefer to have resort to the older and more familiar agreements on mutual 
legal assistance,41 which continue to apply alongside the Framework Decisions on 
mutual recognition. This was particularly the case where requests for assistance not 
only concern the enforcement of a freezing or confiscation order but also other 
investigative or enforcement action (e.g. the search or transfer of evidence), in which 
case a mutual legal assistance request will have to be made anyway. The European 
40 Arcuri v Italy (2001) ECtHR 4 July 2001.  
41 Some are general in nature, whilst others relate more specifically to asset confiscation. Examples of 
the former include Council of Europe Convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters 1959 and 
Council Act of 29 May 2000 establishing the Convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters 
between the Member States of the European Union [2000] OJ C197/24. Examples of the latters include 
Council of Europe 1990 and 2005 Conventions and UN Palermo Convention. 
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Investigation Order might slightly improve the situation, as it provides for a single 
physical form to be filled for all investigation measures and displaces the application 
of mutual legal assistance instruments, but it does not otherwise fundamentally alter 
the EU’s approach to cross-border cooperation.  
 
In addition, although the possibility to block recognition is crucial to the operation of 
the principle of mutual recognition, some of the grounds for refusal seem to leave 
unnecessary discretion to domestic judicial authorities and/or lack justification. For 
example, it is not clear whether the possibility to refuse execution if it conflicts with 
third-party rights would apply to instances where a confiscation order would interfere 
with the rights of legal entities set up by the convicted person to hide his or her illicit 
gains,42 in which case it would be relatively easy for the person to take advantage of 
the legal loopholes created by the free movement of capital or the freedom of 
establishment.  
 
Thirdly, the mutual recognition instruments do not cover all the types of freezing or 
confiscation orders that can be adopted at domestic level, thus often preventing 
recognition and enforcement. For example, while Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA 
explicitly applies to extended confiscation orders, no similar provision exists in 
Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA, which is limited to ordinary confiscation. Thus, 
a freezing order issued with a view to confiscating proceeds that are not connected to 
the specific crime for which the person is being prosecuted cannot be automatically 
enforced in another Member State. While this may be explained by the fact that 
Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA predates Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA, 
the omission is liable to impair the effectiveness of extended confiscation regimes, as 
the whole purpose of freezing regimes is to prevent assets from being disposed of. 
The problem is not expressly addressed in the European Investigation Order and will 
worsen after the deadline for the transposition of the new Directive will pass, given 
that none of the mutual recognition instruments apply to criminal non-conviction 
based confiscation or third party confiscation.  
 
In a similar vein, some types of confiscation orders need to be enforced through other 
channels, adding to the complexity of the regime and the difficulties facing domestic 
authorities when seeking to recover assets abroad.43 Thus, confiscation orders adopted 
for the purpose of compensating the victim rather than a criminal penalty must be 
enforced through Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA on the mutual recognition of 
financial penalties rather than Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA. Similarly, civil 
non-conviction based confiscation orders must go through the procedure laid down in 
the Brussels I Regulation. 44  As of January 2015, the recast Brussels I Regulation 
42 Art 8(2)(d) Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA. 
43 For a fuller discussion see Rand report, above n 4, 43-44.  
44 Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1 now repealed by 
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abolished the exequatur procedure45 and will thus facilitate the enforcement of such 
orders, but it is still possible for the executing Member State to refuse recognition or 
enforcement if it is manifestly contrary to public policy.46 Moreover, this route raises 
particular difficulties when civil courts in the executing Member State, such as in 
Spain, lack themselves jurisdiction under domestic law to issue civil non-conviction 
based orders.47 To bypass such difficulties, the UK has for example adopted a more 
practical approach, by providing Spain with the information necessary to allow it to 
obtain a criminal conviction and, hence, confiscation. But the problem of automatic 
enforcement remains. It also raises difficulties for countries like Finland, Sweden or 
Denmark where criminal courts can exercise civil jurisdiction to order compensation 
for the victim at the request of the prosecutor. This principle of ‘adhesion’, whereby a 
civil case is adhered to a criminal case, gives the victim a claim against the criminal, 
but given the cost and efforts involved in having recourse to the Brussels I procedure, 
these are rarely pursued. The upshot is that criminal assets remain unrecovered and 
victims remain uncompensated. 
 
There are also problems with the EU’s wider legal strategy for promoting cross-
border cooperation. First, one of the implications of the analysis in section 1.1. is that 
EU law does not necessarily guarantee that differences in national legislations that 
tend to create difficulties in the recognition and enforcement of freezing or 
confiscation orders in cross-border cases are eliminated, as the open-ended and vague 
nature of some of the obligations inevitably results in discrepancies between domestic 
laws. The risk of divergences is particularly pronounced given that compliance with 
the principles of legality or legal certainty requires States to add detail to the relevant 
EU law provisions if they want their asset confiscation laws to meet the conditions of 
precision and foreseeability inherent in these two principles.48 More importantly, two 
Member States – Denmark and the UK – have not ‘opted-in’ to the new Directive and 
hence will be altogether subject to different rules. As such, the premise of uniformity 
allegedly necessary to effective cross-border cooperation is unlikely to fully 
materialise.  
 
Last but not least, there are issues with how the EU goes about constructing the 
mutual trust that is supposedly underpinning the principle of mutual recognition.49 
Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
[2012] OJ L351/1. 
45 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 ibid, art 58. 
46 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 ibid, art 45. 
47 In Spain, for example, only criminal courts can order freezing.  
48 For an example from another field see F. Calderoni, ‘A Definition that Could Not Work: the EU 
Framework Decision on the Fight Against Organised Crime’ (2008) 16 European Journal of Crime, 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 265. 
49 E.g. V. Mitsilegas, ‘The Limits of Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: 
From Automatic Inter-State Cooperation to the Slow Emergence of the Individual’ (2012) 31 Yearbook 
of European Law 319.  
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The harmonisation of asset confiscation laws may well foster confidence between 
domestic authorities by ensuring that freezing and confiscation order are adopted 
under broadly speaking similar procedures and conditions. But the over-emphasis on 
confiscation tools has, like in other fields, resulted in an ‘bias towards law 
enforcement’ 50  at the expense of other considerations, such as the protection of 
human rights or the pursuance of social objectives, which ultimately diminishes rather 
than enhances trust. The insertion of procedural safeguards into the new Directive, the 
ability to exercise a limited form of human rights review under the European 
Investigation Order, as well as broader initiatives to harmonise procedural aspects of 
criminal laws51 all constitutes attempts to remedy this imbalance. At the same time, 
however, they signal a rather limited approach to the concept and pursuit of mutual 
trust as centred around compatibility with individual rights rather than the building of 
a more cohesive and collective form of trust. The provisions on social-reuse could 
have been an opportunity through which to pursue such goals, but as we have seen, 
there are too ‘thin’ to make any significant difference in practice.  
 
 
3. Transposition Problems   
 
The second type of barriers to the effectiveness of the EU’s regime arises from the 
lack of proper and/or timely transposition of the relevant rules into domestic laws. 
None of the legal instruments adopted in this field are directly applicable in the 
Member States and hence require transposition before they can take effect at domestic 
level. Yet, back in 2010, a number of Member States had still taken no steps at all to 
give effect to the relevant instruments52 and even when they did, transposition fell 
short of the requirements lay down in the corresponding EU instruments. As regards 
Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA, the problem was particularly pronounced in the 
implementation of the provisions on extended confiscation. Three Member States had 
not introduced such a regime into their domestic laws;53 others put in place stricter 
regimes, requiring for example proof that the accused intended to benefit from the 
crime;54 and others narrowed the scope of application of the regime, limiting extended 
confiscation to money laundering55 or a number of very serious offences punishable 
by a minimum period of imprisonment ranging from 3 years to life sentences or to 
cases where they are significant proceeds. 56  Implementation was equally 
50 W. Wolfgang, ‘Negative and Positive Integration in EU Criminal Law Co-operation’ (2011) 15 
European Integration online Papers available at: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2011-003.pdf. 
51  E.g. Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 amending Framework 
Decisions 2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, thereby 
enhancing the procedural rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition to decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial [2009] OJ L81/24. 
52 See table 3-2 in RAND report, above n 4, 48.  
53 Lithuania, Luxembourg and Slovenia.  
54 See Slovakia and Sweden.  
55 Greece.  
56 Poland sets a threshold of around 50000 EUR. 
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unsatisfactory as regards the two Framework Decisions on mutual recognition. In 
some cases, Member States failed to transpose basic aspects of the framework, such 
as the definition of the terms ‘freezing’ or ‘confiscation’, which are autonomous 
concepts of EU law, into their domestic law, maintaining instead their own national 
definitions. In other cases, the relevant national laws played around with the rules lay 
down in the two Framework Decisions, ignoring or adding to some of its conditions. 
For example, some Member States did not include the requirement that freezing 
orders be recognised within 24 hours,57 whilst others added grounds for refusal/non-
recognition to the list, even though it is meant to be exhaustive.58  
 
How can such transposition problems be explained? Some of the legal problems 
identified in the previous section inevitably have repercussions at the transposition 
stage: to the extent that EU obligations lack clarity or precision, their incorporation 
will continue to create difficulties in practice. Moreover, the EU’s broader 
institutional and constitutional arrangements have not been particularly conducive to 
increasing transposition levels.  Before the Treaty of Lisbon, no proceedings could be 
brought against Member States by the Commission for failure to transpose the 
Framework Decisions and domestic courts could only seek the input of the CJEU on 
the compatibility of their domestic laws with the EU legal framework on asset 
confiscation if their government had ‘opted-in’ to its jurisdiction. 59  Private 
enforcement too was limited as direct effect was expressly precluded in the case of 
Framework Decisions. Moreover, although national courts were under an obligation 
to read national law in the light of the Framework Decisions, 60 the interpretative 
obligation could not be used to impose or aggravate criminal liability,61 which may be 
a problem in countries where confiscation is seen as a criminal penalty. As such, there 
were few mechanisms in place to incentivise transposition and alternatives to ensure 
that, despite poor implementation, EU law can still take effect at domestic level. The 
situation is admittedly likely to improve. The CJEU was granted full jurisdiction in 
matters pertaining to the old third pillar in 2015. As such, it now has a say over the 
transposition of the Framework Decisions and can formally compel Member States to 
implement them. Moreover the new Directives will fall automatically within the 
scope of the CJEU’s powers and their proper transposition will be further incentivised 
by the operation of the principles of (vertical) direct effect and State liability. 
 
Yet, it is equally clear that such considerations alone are not sufficient to explain – 
and hence to solve – deficiencies in transposition, which for example continue to arise 
in the context of EU Directives despite the existence of mechanisms to supervise their 
57  Hungary and Poland are two notable examples. Others, like Slovenia, have had to amend the 
constitutions following adverse judgments by their constitutional court.  
58 The most remarkable is the case of Hungary, which included non-recognition on the basis of a 
conflict with domestic law.  
59 See old Article 35 TEU. 
60 Case C-105/03 Criminal Proceedings against Maria Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285. 
61 Case C-268/06 Impact [2008] ECR I-2483, para.100. 
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implementation. Moreover, our fieldwork suggested that a deeper problem might be at 
play, even though its exact nature still needs to be explored. Thus, in some Member 
States transposition issues arise from concerns to ensure compatibility with domestic 
constitutional law requirements. 62  The provisions on extended confiscation were 
upheld in some countries such as the UK, but experts in Greece and Estonia doubted 
that they could survive constitutional challenge in their country. Similarly, Slovenia 
had to amend its constitution after its Supreme Court ruled that its non-conviction 
based confiscation was unconstitutional and Germany’s ‘asset penalty’ was annulled 
by the German Constitutional Court.63 Moreover, the Romanian Constitution would 
seem to preclude the use of presumptions typical of extended confiscation regimes as 
Article 48(8) provides that legally acquired assets shall not be confiscated and that the 
licit character of acquired assets shall be presumed. In that regard, it is important to 
note that constitutional limits or impediments are not uniform across the EU and that 
even concepts such as the presumption of innocence or the right to property – which 
are common to most Member States – may be interpreted in very different ways.  
 
Similarly, despite the exhaustive list of grounds for refusal in the Framework 
Decisions on mutual recognition, States are sometimes reluctant to completely strip 
their domestic courts of the ability to review foreign orders for their compatibility 
with human rights. The new jurisdiction of the CJEU, which will enable it to exercise 
some limited form of review on the compatibility of domestic laws falling within the 
scope of the EU’s asset confiscation measures with EU fundamental rights, may 
slightly alleviate fears that the automatic recognition and recognition of a freezing or 
confiscation order may lead to a breach of fundamental rights. At the same time, the 
CJEU does not have jurisdiction over ‘the validity or proportionality of operations 
carried out by the police or other law-enforcement services of a Member State or the 
exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the 
maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security’64 and thus 
over a number of quite sensitive aspects of asset confiscation, such as the gathering of 
information about the origin of the assets or the preventative seizure of property by 
police forces. Moreover, the EU standard of protection may also be lower than the 
one mandated by domestic legal requirements. Finally, it would seem that 
transposition issues sometimes arise because the relevant EU measures may prove to 
be ill-suited to the cultural or socio-economic conditions of a particular Member 
State. As such, there is a problem of ‘translation’ or ‘adaptation’ of the EU produced 
norm into the otherwise largely ‘national’ criminal justice system that is not readily 
detectable at the time the EU instrument is adopted but only arises once States attempt 
to put it into effect.  
 
 
62 For a full discussion see Rand report, above n 4, 45.  
63 Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 20 March 2002 (2002 NJW: 1779) 
64 Art 276 TFEU.  
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4. Institutional Barriers 
 
The final impediment to effective asset confiscation policies across Europe is the 
weak institutional capacities for putting asset confiscation instruments into practice. 
As is well known, the EU does not have its own independent enforcement apparatus 
but depends on its Member States for its application and execution. As such, the 
effectiveness of EU law very much depends on the extent to which Member States 
have the institutional capabilities on the ground.  
 
In this particular context, successful recovery requires a complex set of institutions to 
work together at each stage of the recovery process i.e. the identification, 
preservation, confiscation, and enforcement stages. Each of the institutions fulfilling 
these four functions can suffer from deficiencies, which impede the effective 
utilisation of relevant legal powers and hence the success of the recovery process. On 
the basis of our institutional mapping which mapped the key institutional features that 
were lacking at national level based on an analysis of the available asset recovery 
statistics and a series of interviews with representatives of each of these institutions 
across Europe,65 we identified the following key problem areas. 
 
Institutionally, there is first a significant ‘cultural’ problem. In most Member States, 
asset confiscation does not form part of the everyday practice and thinking of police 
officers, prosecutors or judges. This may be partly explained by the skills sets of each 
of these actors, which are rarely directly connected to asset confiscation (e.g. few 
judges’ formal education include asset confiscation as a separate subject). But it also 
relates to their organisational culture, goals or priorities. For example, asset 
confiscation is often perceived to add to delays in the overall processing of pending 
cases, which is not looked upon particularly favourably (or even at all tolerated) in 
some countries. This has become even more problematic with the increase of judicial 
backlog and other pressures on domestic justice systems that have resulted from the 
budget cuts impacting them since 2010.  
 
A lack of ‘motivational structures’ capable of altering existing work patterns and 
priorities across the justice system represent the second major institutional barrier we 
identified. Devoting adequate time and resources for asset recovery necessarily 
requires greater investment on the part of those public bodies that take part in asset 
recovery work, be it investigative bodies, enforcement agencies or courts (e.g. hiring 
financial investigators, devoting scarce time). In most Member States, incentives for 
such investment, either positive or negative, are largely lacking. Asset confiscation 
usually comes on top of the traditional work of judges, investigators and other law 
enforcement officials without official recognition in performance evaluation, or 
65 See Rand report, above n 4, annexe A.  
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organisational budgets (e.g. additional funds for the extra work entailed by asset 
confiscation activities).   
 
Thirdly, there are difficulties in building new institutional frameworks – and 
particularly advanced financial investigation capabilities – that are necessary to 
support effective asset recovery, particularly now that post-financial crisis budget cuts 
reduced spending on crucial investigative tools in many Member States. A number of 
countries have created new specialised units or semi-independent bodies, which 
concentrate on the more complex and large-value cases. However, while it is 
relatively easy to train special magistrates to undertake such cases, the real challenge 
lies in linking up any such high capacity body to the rest of the justice system in such 
a way as to ensure that the whole system functions effectively. At the moment, the 
different institutions tend in contrast to operate in a rather disjointed manner.  
 
Fourthly, within the EU, but at a global level too, organised crime is becoming 
increasingly internationalised and skilled in hiding illicit income and assets. Criminals 
have invested heavily into identifying and exploiting the loopholes of international 
legal regimes such as the existence of jurisdictions with high levels of financial 
secrecy or confidentiality or the lack of effective circulation of information between 
Member States. Yet, institutional fora for cooperation remain under-developed. 
International cooperation and data sharing is in particular hampered by the lack of 
language skills, inadequate knowledge of the most appropriate procedure (e.g. mutual 
recognition or mutual legal assistance), the administrative burden associated with the 
more complex international cases, and the lack of trust and willingness to cooperate 
among domestic bodies,66 despite an underlying assumption of confidence in each 
others’ justice systems on the legal plane.  
 
 
5. Way Forward? 
 
5.1. Methodology 
 
So what is the way forward? Methodologically, our mapping suggested that there is a 
need to better understand the legal and institutional barriers that impede asset 
recovery at domestic level. Whilst there is for example a sense that some Member 
States do not have the necessary legal tools in place for successful recovery or that 
cross-border cooperation is impeded by differences in national legislations, the exact 
nature or extent of the problem remains to be adequately pined down. In particular, 
any future legal or institutional mapping of the field would need to contextualise 
domestic rules and institutions by taking into account the broader legal, cultural and 
66 V. Van Tiggelen and L. Surano, ‘Analysis of the Future of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters 
in the European Union, Institute for European Studies’ (2008) Institute for European Studies, 
Université Libre de Bruxelles.  
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socio-economic conditions prevalent in each Member State. To that end, the legal 
mapping should avoid recourse to universal legal categories, but should instead seek 
to evaluate domestic laws in the light of the particular form and scale of criminal 
activity in each of the Member State and the nature and purpose of confiscation 
within the relevant domestic legal system. Greater attention should also be paid to 
identifying the underlying causes for differences between Member States’ laws and 
possible sources of distrust in their criminal legal systems. Moreover, far greater 
research should be put into understanding particular aspects and concepts of criminal 
procedures, such as standards of proofs, which tend to vary significantly between 
Member States. In fact, in some countries like France where emphasis is placed on the 
‘intime conviction du juge’, it would be somewhat misleading to speak of ‘standard of 
proof’ in the traditional sense of the term. On the other hand, in order to more 
adequately understand institutional barriers, data on utilisation of asset confiscation 
tools should be collected on a disaggregated level (e.g. individual public bodies at 
different stages of the judicial process). In addition, resources committed to and costs 
associated with asset confiscation work should be measured separately so that 
targeted interventions to increase the necessary institutional capacities can be 
designed. 
 
 
5.2. Legal Solutions 
 
In terms of concrete legal solutions, given the new Directive and the European 
Investigation Order have just been adopted, the likelihood of a radical legislative 
change is small in the short term and there is an argument to the effect that these 
instruments should first be put into place prior to seriously re-thinking the area. 
Indeed, some of the officials we interviewed expressed the view that the mutual 
recognition measures should be allowed to ‘settle’ before considering reform as 
frequent legal changes make it even harder for practitioners to familiarise themselves 
with, and hence make greater us of, the EU instruments. Moreover, in addition to 
improving transposition, the institutional changes brought about by the Treaty of 
Lisbon as regards the public and private enforcement of the EU measures in this area 
might shed light on which barriers have the greatest impact on the effectiveness of 
asset confiscation work. In other words, if better transposition does not lift asset 
recovery numbers, it will suggest that the problem is either with the legal regime itself 
or with the institutional mechanisms in place to enforce it.  
 
However, some smaller legal changes and developments could help enhance the 
effectiveness of the regime. In particular, the relationship between the different 
instruments could be clarified, and any conflicts abolished, by amending the relevant 
Framework Decisions. When solicited, the CJEU should also give clear guidance to 
domestic courts as to the interpretation of the relevant provisions of EU law, 
particularly when they place the onus on domestic courts to decide whether the 
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relevant regime applies (e.g. whether the assets can be held to derive from criminal 
conduct in the case of extended confiscation).  
 
Moreover, in preparation for future reforms, a wider debate should be initiated about 
the theoretical underpinnings of the EU’s asset confiscation regime.67 Three things in 
particular would merit clarification. First, the EU should clarify the objective of asset 
confiscation in the EU. The rationale for acting at EU level seemed to have been the 
combatting of organised crime and the new Directive suggests indeed that 
confiscation should be reserved for the more serious forms of crime only, but the 
scope of the original Framework Decision is underpinned by a wider punitive 
objective. Second, the EU should clarify what the purpose of harmonisation is and 
whether this is indeed the best way to ensuring higher recovery rates. The Treaties 
themselves are rather obscure on this point. Article 82 TFEU makes a close link 
between the harmonisation of criminal laws and the facilitation of mutual recognition 
– indeed requires such a link for the harmonisation of certain listed aspects of 
criminal procedure – but it is not clear whether it applies to other areas, or what 
exactly it may require in practice. Article 83 TFEU, on the other hand, limits 
approximation of the definition of criminal offences and sanctions to serious crimes 
with a cross-border dimension, suggesting that the EU’s intervention should be 
limited to particular forms of criminal activity whose scale and effects are such that it 
cannot be tackled by mobilising domestic repressive mechanisms alone. As a result, 
there is a striking opacity as to whether the approximation of domestic laws is 
designed to establish a minimum level playing field across the EU in particular areas, 
to eliminate differences in legal regimes that can be exploited by criminal 
organisations to further their aims, to facilitate mutual recognition, to build mutual 
trust among judicial and law enforcement bodies, to create a unified area of law or 
even just to facilitate free movement, a more economic objective. Often, these are all 
mentioned in tandem, but the lack of a focused and clearly articulated purpose makes 
the task of designing effective legal rules rather difficult. For example, vague 
principles may be appropriate if the aim is merely to ensure that Member States have 
some tools available at domestic level to confiscate criminal assets, but much less so 
if the objective is to abolish discrepancies or building trust. Finally, a serious debate 
should be had about the sort of measures or initiatives that could contribute to 
alleviating trust issues between Member States rather than focusing merely on 
strengthening the repressive arm of the State.  
 
 
5.3. Institutional Solutions 
 
67 This echoes wider concerns about the theoretical implications of EU criminal law. E.g. M. Fletcher, 
B. Gillmore and R. Loof EU Criminal Law and Justice (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008).  
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However, the EU should not follow an exclusively legal strategy but also seek to 
contribute to the organisational and institutional difficulties faced by the Member 
States discussed in section 4. As regards first the need for better knowledge and 
information, the EU could for example support training provision for senior officials 
and those in charge of every day operations. One example of the transformative 
power of information provision and capacity development is the creation of the 
Identification of Criminal Assets Commission in France. This Commission 
contributed to greater knowledge of asset confiscation work (e.g. legal instruments, 
the role of specialised organisations etc) and provided expert support for 
investigators, which led to a noticeable culture change and achieved substantial 
results in terms of increasing the amount of confiscated assets. Training workshops 
are likely to be particularly indispensable for improving cross-border utilisation where 
differences in administrative regimes and languages provide further barriers. 
 
The EU could also promote the establishment of adequate motivational structures 
capable of incentivising the utilisation of asset confiscation tools. Positive incentives 
could for example include the introduction of asset recovery-related standards into 
judges’ performance evaluation, the granting of explicit external funds such as central 
government earmarked funds, or the creation of incentives directly out of the recovery 
work such as the possibility to retain a part of the profits from the confiscated assets. 
The success of the latter policy can for example be illustrated by the UK experience 
where asset recovery figures started to climb after the introduction of the Asset 
Recovery Incentivisation Scheme under which 50% of the revenue stream generated 
by confiscated assets is returned to the agencies who played a role in their recovery. 
The new Directive may itself contribute to creating such positive incentives a more 
robust legal regime may increase profitability margins, although its precise impact 
will depend on how such profits are re-distributed at the national level. Negative 
incentives may take the form of penalties/punishment for not contributing to asset 
recovery, as well as making the consideration of confiscating assets mandatory in 
criminal proceedings or at least limiting judicial discretion in utilising freezing and 
confiscation orders. Given the limited powers of the EU in the field of criminal 
procedure, however, these latter options may be more difficult to pursue at EU level. 
 
The EU could also promote the creation of new organisational and institutional 
capacities that are best tailored to the particular needs of asset confiscation, as it has 
done by requiring the creation of asset recovery offices. The Criminal Assets Bureau 
in Ireland provides a good example of a specialised body armed with well-trained 
investigators that can achieve substantial results even when local level bodies are 
much less inclined and institutionally ready to incorporate asset confiscation work in 
their daily routines. Thus, the Criminal Assets Bureau recovers assets worth 10-20 
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million EUR annually mainly relying on its own power to levy tax on previously 
undeclared income.68 
 
5.4. Limitations 
 
At the same time, there are necessary limits to the extent to which effective asset 
recovery, as a policy objective, can be pursued using the EU legal machinery. Even at 
domestic level, considerations of efficiency or crime deterrence have to be measured 
against broader ethical, legal and normative questions about the functioning and 
broader social purpose of the criminal justice system. Civil non-conviction based 
confiscation, for example, is criticised by civil liberties movements and tends to be 
controversial in capitalist economies centred on the protection of private property 
such that many Member States are averse to introducing that option into their 
domestic legal orders. But in the context of the EU, distinct issues arise as regard the 
justification for, and legitimacy of, EU intervention given that the EU has no general 
power to legislate in the field of criminal justice but is instead restrained by the 
principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality, which have been held to be 
particularly important in the field of EU criminal law.69 In particular, despite some 
modest changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, there continues to be a notable 
asymmetry between the EU’s power to legislate in the field of substantive criminal 
law and its ability (and willingness) to regulate procedural aspects. As such, 
effectiveness issues that are traceable to particular features of domestic criminal 
procedures are difficult to address through the medium of the EU.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Particularly in the EU, there is a tendency to view the law and/or regulation as the 
primary vehicle through which to coordinate action and pursue particular objectives. 
The trend is amply illustrated in the field of asset confiscation, where the need to 
effectively combat organised crime provided the impetus for the introduction of 
common rules at the level of the EU and for procedures aimed at ensuring efficient 
cross-border cooperation between Member States. When the framework was shown to 
be largely ineffective in securing higher recovery rates, the answer was again sought 
on the legal plane, by amending parts of the relevant regime and expanding its scope 
to areas that were previously left unregulated. It is obviously too early to gauge the 
success of those amendments, as one will have to at least wait for the implementation 
deadlines of the new Directive and the European Investigation Order to pass before 
reaching more concrete conclusions.  
 
68 See annual reports of Ireland’s Criminal Assets Bureau. 
69 E. Herlin-Karnell, ‘EU Competence in Criminal Law after Lisbon’ in A. Biondi, P. Eeckhout, and S. 
Ripley (eds) EU Law after Lisbon (OUP, 2012).  
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Yet, the present article questioned the extent to which these are likely to mark an 
improvement in asset recovery work. Even as amended, the EU legal regime not only 
contains gaps, uncertainties and inconsistencies, but also fails to tackle the sort of 
issues that seem to impede effective recovery in practice i.e. there are questions as to 
whether it is suitable to achieving its stated objectives. The problem is aggravated by 
the fact that the EU regime lacks a clearly articulated purpose that would allow for a 
full rationalisation of the added value of EU intervention and the drawing of a regime 
that allows this potential to be fully realised. Moreover, the EU’s over-reliance on 
formal legal solutions has come at the expense of other crucial institutional and 
utilisation questions, which cannot be tackled solely through legal reform. If anything, 
this structural bias for legal answers has been consolidated by the Treaty of Lisbon 
given that its main input towards improving the overall effectiveness of EU law in the 
AFSJ is through the tightening and institutionalisation of human rights protection, as 
well the introduction of more far-reaching enforcement and review mechanisms.  
 
This approach is not particularly surprising if one has regard to the EU 
concept/principle of effectiveness, which has traditionally placed emphasis on 
ensuring the effectiveness of EU law qua law through various mechanisms such as the 
doctrines of direct effect or supremacy, rather than on the effectiveness of the 
underlying policies and objectives that EU law supposedly seeks to pursue. This may 
have worked in building the single market by removing obstacles to trade, as the mere 
enforcement of EU provisions on free movement was sufficient to achieve the 
objective of liberalising national markets. But our fieldwork suggested it is unlikely to 
yield significant results in this area or indeed in the building of a genuine AFSJ.  
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